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Abstract 
Labor productivity in developed countries is analyzed and modeled. Modeling is based on our previous 
finding that the rate of labor force participation is a unique function of GDP per capita. Therefore, labor productivity 
is fully determined by the rate of economic growth, and thus, is a secondary economic variable. 
Initially, we assess a model for the U.S. and then test it using data for Japan, France, the UK, Italy, and 
Canada. Results obtained for these countries validate those for the U.S. The evolution of labor force productivity is 
predictable at least at an 11-year horizon.  
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Introduction 
Mainstream economics sees labor productivity as the central problem for the understanding of 
economic evolution. An elevated rate of the growth in labor productivity in the 1990s was 
considered by Blinder and Yellen (2002) as the driving force of the excellent economic 
performance. Correspondingly, a slightly lowered growth rate in the 1970s was responsible for 
“the woeful macroeconomic performance of that decade”. Bearing in mind the importance of 
labor productivity for theoretical and practical purposes, we would like to answer two basic 
questions: 
 
1. What is the driving force behind the growth of labor productivity? 
2. Is it possible to control this force and to achieve stable economic growth? 
 
Quantitative answers to these questions would allow elaboration of a set of reasonable policies in 
many areas aimed at the acceleration of real economic growth. 
From our previous experience with analyzing and modeling real economic growth, 
among numerous aspects associated with the study of labor productivity, we are specifically 
interested in its link to the growth in real GDP per capita and to labor force participation rate. For 
example, Campbell (1994) and Pakko (2002) reported that a decrease in the growth rate of 
productivity rate results in increasing in employment and output. In several working papers 
(Kitov, 2006ab; Kitov, Kitov, and Dolinskaya, 2007a) we demonstrated that the evolution of real 
GDP per capita in the USA is driven by the change in the number of 9-year-olds. In turn, Kitov 
and Kitov (2008) found that the evolution of labor force participation rate is controlled by real 
GDP per capita as the only driving force. By definition, labor productivity is a ratio of real GDP 
and the number of employed persons (or the number of worked hours). Hence, the growth in 
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productivity is also driven by the only macroeconomic variable – real GDP per capita (or the 
change in the specific age population). 
Conventional economics includes extensive literature devoted to the understanding and 
modeling of the forces (beyond that we investigate here) behind real economic growth. 
Handbook of Economic Growth (2005) is a valuable source of relevant information and 
references. Since we are focusing on the aforementioned links in this paper, we explain long- and 
mid-term trends as well as short-term fluctuations in labor productivity using only real economic 
growth. Our analysis for the USA is supported and validated by a cross-country comparison. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents some working 
assumptions and quantitative relationships between labor productivity, labor force participation 
rate, the growth rate of real GDP per capita, and the number of 9-year-olds. In Section 2, we test 
these relationships against actual data and present some predictions of the future evolution of 
productivity in the USA. Section 3 extends our analysis to some other developed countries. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The model  
For the estimation of (average) labor productivity, P, one needs to know total output, GDP, and 
the level of employment, E (P=GDP/E), or total number of working hours, H (P=GDP/H). First 
definition includes employment, which is usually determined in the Current Population Surveys 
conduced at a monthly rate by the U.S. Census Bureau. In the first approximation and for the 
purposes of our modeling, we neglect the difference between the employment and the level of 
labor force because the number of unemployed is only a small portion of the labor force. There is 
no principal difficulty, however, in the subtraction of the unemployment, which is completely 
defined by the labor force level with possible complication in some countries induced by time 
lags (Kitov, 2006cd, Kitov, Kitov, and Dolinskaya, 2007b). Hence, a more accurate relationship 
between productivity and real GDP per capita is potentially available.  
The number of working hours is an independent measure of the workforce. Employed 
people do not have the same amount of working hours. Therefore, the number of working hours 
may change without any change in the level of employment and vice versa. In this study, the 
estimates associated with H are used as an independent measure of productivity and for 
demonstration of the inherent uncertainty in definitions of labor productivity. 
Obviously, individual productivity varies in a wide range in developed economies. In 
order to obtain a hypothetical true value of average labor productivity one needs to sum up 
individual productivity of each and every employed person with corresponding working time. 
This definition allows a proper correction when one unit of labor is added or subtracted and 
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distinguishes between two states with the same employment and hours worked but with different 
productivity. Hence, both standard definitions are slightly biased and represent approximations 
to the true productivity. Due to the absence of true estimates of labor productivity and related 
uncertainty in the approximating definitions we do not put severe constraints on the precision in 
our modeling and seek only for a visual fit between observed and predicted estimates. 
Real GDP in the definitions of labor productivity is a measured macroeconomic variable. 
There is no need to model it in this study and we use the estimates reported by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). Second term (E or H) in the definitions can be and is actually 
measured. At the same time, it has been definitely driven by one exogenous variable since the 
mid-1960s. Recently, we developed a model (Kitov and Kitov, 2008) describing the evolution of 
labor force participation rate, LFP, in developed countries as a function of a single defining 
variable – real GDP per capita, G. Natural fluctuations in real economic growth unambiguously 
lead to relevant changes in labor force participation rate as expressed by the following 
relationship: 
 
{B1dLFP(t)/LFP(t) + C1}exp{ α1[LFP(t) - LFP(t0)]/LFP(t0) = 
= ∫ {dG(t-T))/G(t-T) – A1/G(t-T)}dt     (1) 
 
where B1 and C1 are empirical (country-specific) calibration constants, α1 is empirical (also 
country-specific) exponent, t0 is the start year of modeling, T is the time lag, and dt=t2-t1, t1 and 
t2  are the start and the end time of the time period for the integration of g(t) = dG(t-T))/G(t-T) – 
A1/G(t-T) (one year in our model). Term A1/G(t-T), where A1 is empirical constant, represents the 
evolution of potential economic growth (Kitov, 2006b). The exponential term defines the change 
in the sensitivity to G due to deviation of the LFP from its initial value LFP(t0). Relationship (1) 
fully determines the behavior of the LFP when G is an exogenous variable. 
It follows from (1) that productivity can be represented as a function of LFP and G, 
P~G·N/N·LFP = G/LFP, where N is the working age population. Hence, P is a function of G 
only. Therefore, the growth rate of labor productivity can be represented using several 
independent variables. Because the change in productivity is synchronized with that in G and 
labor force participation, first useful form mimics (1): 
  
dP(t)/P(t) = {B2dLFP(t)/LFP(t) + C2}·exp{ α1[LFP(t) - LFP(t0)]/LFP(t0)} (1′) 
 
where B2 and C2 are empirical calibration constants. Inherently, the participation rate is not the 
driving force of productivity, but (1′) demonstrates an important feature of the link between P 
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and LFP – the same change in the participation rate may result in different changes in the 
productivity depending on the level of the LFP. 
In order to obtain a simple functional dependence between P and G one can use two 
alternative forms of (1), as proposed by Kitov and Kitov (2008):  
 
{B3dLFP(t)/LFP(t) + C3} exp{α2[LFP(t) - LFP(t0)]/LFP(t0)} = N9(t-T)    
dP(t)/P(t)  = B4N9(t-T)+ C4    (2) 
 
where N9 is the number of 9-year-olds, B3,…, C4 are empirical constant different from B2, C2, and 
α2=α1. In this representation, we  use our finding that the evolution of real GDP per capita is 
driven by the change rate of the number of 9-year-olds (specific age for U.S. population). 
Relationship (2) links dP/P and N9 directly. 
The next relationship defines dP/P as a nonlinear function of G and serves a workhorse 
for those countries, which do not provide accurate estimates of specific age population. General 
nonlinear dependence between P and G is as follows: 
 
N(t2) = N(t1)·{ 2[dG(t2-T)/G(t2-T) - A2/G(t2-T)] + 1}     (3) 
 
dP(t2)/P(t2) = N(t2-T)/B + C     (4) 
 
where N(t) is the (formally defined) specific age population, as obtained using A2 instead of A1, B 
and C are empirical constants. Relationship (3) defines the evolution of some specific age 
population, which is different from actual one. This discrete form is useful for calculations. 
 So, there are three different relationships to test. We use a simplified form of testing 
procedure - visual fit between measured and predicted rate of productivity growth. The estimates 
of goodness-of-fit obtained using linear regression analysis are facultative ones. 
 
2. Modeling the evolution of productivity in the U.S. 
There are several sources of productivity estimates. We use the estimates reported by the 
Conference Board (2008) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008). Our model predicts the 
change rate of labor productivity. The upper panel in Figure 1 presents four time series which 
correspond to two different definitions of productivity. Two curves represent output in U.S. 
dollars per one hour (ratio of total output and total working hours in the USA). Other two curves 
represent output per employed person per year. These four curves span the period between 1960 
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and 2007 and demonstrate similar overall behavior with a deep trough around 1980. Also, notice 
a decline in productivity since 2003 for all definitions. 
Amplitudes of fluctuations clearly differ between the curves. Output per person is 
characterized by a slightly higher volatility. Due to the observed uncertainty in definitions and 
measurements one should not expect any model to precisely reproduce these curves. The lower 
panel depicts the original time series smoothed by a centered 5-year moving average, MA(5). 
Only output per person estimated by the BLS still has negative values near 1980. 
 At first, we test our basic hypothesis that the evolution of labor force participation can 
define that of labor productivity. As discussed above, we replace employment, E, in the 
definition of productivity with LFP. Thus, one has to estimate coefficients B2, C2, and α1, which 
provide the best (visual) fit between the observed and predicted time series. Figure 2 depicts two 
curves reported by the BLS (both GDP/E and GDP/H) and those predicted with B2= -5.0, 
C2=0.040, and α1=5.0; and B2= -3.5, C2=0.042, and α1=3.8, respectively. Due to volatility in the 
original productivity and labor force (time derivative) series we replace them with their MA(5). 
A five-year-long time interval provides an increased resolution and allows smoothing 
measurement noise. As expected, coefficient B2 is negative implying a decline in productivity 
with increasing labor supply. Both exponents α1 are positive. According to (1′), this fact 
indicates that the sensitivity of productivity to changes in labor force participation (or to real 
economic growth) increases with the level of LFP. The goodness-of-fit for both observed time 
series is about (R2=) 0.6. Moreover, principal features (troughs and peaks) of the observed series 
are similar in the predicted series, with small time shifts, however. One can approximately divide 
the whole period into two segments - before and after 1990. In these segments, the predicted 
curves lag behind and lead the observed ones, respectively. 
 As in our previous paper (Kitov and Kitov, 2008), the number of 9-year-olds is obtained 
from the Census Bureau (2008). [Also, we use here the estimates of real GDP per capita (in 1990 
U.S. dollars converted at Geary Khamis PPPs) as presented by the Conference Board (2008).] 
These population estimates allow to model labor productivity as defined by (2). Figure 3 
compares the BLS (per hour) labor productivity and that obtained using (2) with the following 
coefficients: B3=48000000, C3=-0.062, and T=2 years. The overall fit is reasonably good with 
R2=0.46. There is a period of large discrepancy between the observed and predicted curves in the 
mid-1980s. As with labor force participation, the predicted time series leads the observed one by 
2 years. 
 Figure 4 compares two different predictions of productivity: the one obtained from the 
LFP and that from the N9. The LFP predicted curve is smoothed with MA(5) and that from N9 is 
obtained with original annual readings. The agreement between these two curves is slightly 
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better than their agreement with the measured productivity curves. This better agreement might 
be related to the fact that both predictions are associated with population estimates and the 
productivity is estimated using real GDP reported by the BEA. Revisions to these different time 
series might be not synchronous and create time shifts in the curves. Problems induced by 
numerous revisions to population and GDP time series deserve more attention. 
 Relationship (2) provides a unique opportunity to predict the evolution of productivity at 
an 11-year-long time horizon. The number of 9-year-olds can be extrapolated 9 years ahead 
using population estimates in younger cohorts. Additional 2 years are related to the time lag 
between real economic growth and productivity change. Figure 5 presents population estimates 
for 9-, 6- and 1-year-olds as published by the U.S. Census Bureau (2008). The curves for 
younger ages are shifted ahead by 3 and 8 years is order to synchronize them with the current 
estimates of 9-year-olds. The level of the curves increases with time due to positive overall 
migration, i.e. the number of 9-year-olds in a given year is the number of 1-year-olds 8 years 
before plus net migration less total deaths. We are interested in the change rate of N9, however. 
The lower panel in Figure 5 demonstrates that the estimates of the change rate are very close for 
all three cohorts, except some short periods, where revisions to these series were different. This 
closeness implies that one can replace the change rate of N9 8 years ahead with the current 
change rate of the number of 1-year-olds. Hence, productivity in the USA will grow at an 
elevated (relative to potential) rate during the 2010s. This process will be obviously 
accompanied by an associated decrease in the LFP. If the population estimates are accurate, one 
can expect sharp changes in real economic growth, labor force participation, and thus, in 
productivity. 
 Relationships (3) and (4) define productivity as a function of real economic growth. 
Figure 6 shows the difference between real GDP per capita and productivity. (Linear regression 
gives the goodness-of-fit of R2=0.61.) The productivity varies with lower amplitudes because 
employment is synchronized with the evolution of G and total population does not depend on G. 
Two potential growth rates related to G and P are also shown: A1/G and A2/G, where A1=$420 
and A2=$398. The potential rate of real economic growth is slightly higher than that for 
productivity. Both constants are determined with high accuracy because even small deviations in 
the rates results in large deviations in cumulative growth. Therefore, the difference between A1 
and A2 is significant despite the curves are so close. The observed productivity curve was below 
its potential between 1965 and 1982. As compensation, this period is characterized by intensive 
growth in labor force participation. Since 1982, the productivity fluctuates around its potential. 
 Results of productivity modeling by (3) and (4) are presented in Figure 7. (Model 
parameters are given in Figure captions.) Overall, 60% of variability in observed curve is 
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explained by the predicted one – same as explained by G itself. Timing of main turns in the 
curves is excellent. This is an expected effect, however, because productivity is essentially the 
same class variable as real GDP per capita. An important feature to predict is amplitude, as 
Figure 6 indicates - productivity is not a scaled version of real GDP per capita. So, the success of 
our model is related to a good prediction of LFP. Modeling of the evolution of productivity for 
other developed countries using relevant GDP per capita is necessary to validate our model. 
 
3. Modeling labor productivity in developed countries 
In this Section, we use only relationship (3) and (4) for the prediction of labor productivity in a 
number of developed countries. Essentially, these are the countries for which we modeled labor 
force participation – France, Italy, Canada, Japan, and the UK. These countries are the largest 
developed economies in the world. The evolution of productivity in Germany is not modeled 
because of side effects induced by the reunification in the 1990s. 
 The upper panel in Figure 8 presents observed and predicted productivity growth rate in 
France. It has been decreasing from 0.05 y-1 in the 1960s to 0.02 y-1 in the 2000s. This is the 
result of real economic growth below its (relatively high) potential rate defined by A2=$450, as 
the lower panel in Figure 8 demonstrates. Both productivity curves are well synchronized but are 
non-stationary. This might make problematic the results of linear regression analysis with 
R2=0.91 due to a possibility of spurious regression. However, both variables include real GDP as 
the main part. Hence, high correlation between them is not a surprise. All in all, the predicted 
curve is in excellent agreement with the observed one and this observation confirms the results 
for the USA and supports our model.  
 Figure 9 depicts observed and predicted productivity for Italy. These curves are similar to 
those for France and are also in an excellent agreement: the goodness-of-fit is also very high - 
(R2=) 0.9. The range of productivity change for Italy is even larger: from 0.08 y-1 in the 1960s to 
0.0 y-1 in the 2000s. Hence, real economic growth has been far below its potential rate since 
1960s. The current rate of productivity growth is very low and one should not expect any break 
in the declining trend. The growth rate of labor force has been hovering around zero line since 
the mid-1970s. 
 The case of Canada adds some new features to our analysis. Figure 10 displays measured 
and predicted rate of productivity growth. The curves are very close with R2=0.8, but are 
characterized by the presence of three peaks – in the early 1960s, between 1983 and 1987, and 
around 1995. This pattern is quite different from that observed in the USA – the closest neighbor 
and main trade partner. So, real economic evolution in Canada and U.S. is likely to be 
independent. For Canada, the range of productivity change is smaller than that in France and 
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Italy: from 0.03 y-1 in the 1960s to 0.0 y-1 in 1980. The current rate of productivity growth is also 
close to 0. 
United Kingdom and Japan are presented in Figure 11 and 12, respectively. They are 
similar in sense that accurate prediction from G is possible only after 1970. The predicted curves 
describe amplitudes and timing of major turns in the observed curves. The discrepancy before 
1970 is not well explained and might be linked to revisions to employment and real economic 
growth definitions and measurement errors. 
  
4. Conclusion 
In Introduction, we formulated two general questions. To answer the first of them, we have 
modeled productivity growth in the largest (except Germany) developed economies – the USA, 
Japan, the UK, France, Italy, and Canada. With a varying level of success, the growth rate of 
productivity is explained by the influence of a single driving force – real GDP per capita. As a 
dependent variable, labor productivity can be predicted at various time horizons with the 
uncertainty determined only by the accuracy of population estimates. 
The answer to the second question is – "yes". Productivity, as an economic variable, is of 
a secondary importance. The growth of GDP per capita above or below its potential rate, as 
defined by the term A2/G, is transferred one-to-one in relevant changes in labor force 
participation and, thus, in employment and productivity. Since real economic growth depends 
only on the evolution of specific age population, one must control demographic processes in 
order to control productivity and stable economic growth. 
One may also conclude that all attempts to place labor productivity in the center of 
conventional theories of real economic growth are practically worthless. Productivity is not an 
independent variable, which can be influenced and controlled by any means except demography. 
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Figure 1. The upper panel displays four time series for two definitions of the growth rate of labor 
productivity in the USA as expressed in $ per hour and in $ per person per year – for both the 
Conference Board and the BLS. These series span the period between 1960 and 2007. Output per 
person is characterized by a slightly higher volatility. Notice the decline in the productivity since 
2003 for all three definitions. The lower panel depicts the original time series smoothed by a 
centered MA(5). Only the BLS measured output per person still has negative values near 1980. 
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Figure 2. Observed and predicted growth rate of labor productivity. Two BLS measures of 
productivity are presented: a) output ($) per person ; b) output ($) per hour. 
Linear regression gives close results - R2=0.6 in both cases. 
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Figure 3. Observed and predicted change rate of productivity (BLS output per hour). The 
observed curve is represented by MA(5) of the original one. The predicted rate is obtained from 
the number of 9-year-olds according to relationship (2). Main features of the observed growth 
are relatively well predicted by the evolution of the number of 9-year-olds. R2=0.46. 
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Figure 4. The growth rate of productivity as predicted from the LFP and the number of 9-year-
olds. Main fluctuations in the predicted curves are well synchronized. 
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Figure 5. Prediction of the number of 9-year-olds by extrapolation of population estimates for 
younger ages (1- and 6-year-olds).  
a) Total population estimates. The time series for younger ages are shifted ahead by 8 and 3 
years, respectively. 
b) Change rate of the population estimates, which is proportional to the growth rate of real GDP 
per capita. Notice the difference in the change rate provided by 1-year-olds and 6-year-olds for 
the period between 2003 and 2010. This discrepancy is related to the age-dependent difference in 
population revisions. 
A downward trend in productivity, as has been observed since 2003, will turn to an 
upward one in the 2010s. This also means an elevated growth rate of real GDP per capita during 
the period between 2010 and 2017. 
 
 15 
 
 
-4.0E-02
-2.0E-02
0.0E+00
2.0E-02
4.0E-02
6.0E-02
8.0E-02
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
calendar year
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
dG/G
dP/P
A2/G
A1/G
 
Figure 6. The growth rate of productivity, dP/P, and real GDP per capita, dG/G. Corresponding 
potential growth rates A1/G and A2/G are also shown. The curve dP/P is below the potential 
between 1965 and 1983. 
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Figure 7. Observed and predicted change rate of productivity (Conference Board GDP per 
person employed). The observed curve is represented by MA(5) of the original one. Linear 
regression gives R2=0.6.  
Model parameters are as follows: N(1959) = 4500000, A2=$420, B=3500000, C=-0.095. 
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Figure 8. Upper panel: observed and predicted productivity in France. Model parameters: 
N(1959)=570000, A2=$450, B=7500000, C=-0.022. R2=0.91. Lower panel: dG/G and A2/G. 
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Figure 9. Observed and predicted productivity in Italy: N(1959)=570000, A2=$550, B=5000000, 
C=-0.018. R2=0.9. 
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Figure 10. Observed and predicted productivity in Canada: N(1959)=270000, A2=$300, 
 B=-3200000, C=0.108. R2=0.8. 
 20 
 
 
0.0E+00
1.0E-02
2.0E-02
3.0E-02
4.0E-02
5.0E-02
6.0E-02
7.0E-02
8.0E-02
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
calendar year
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
dP/P GDP
dP/P measured
 
Figure 11. Observed and predicted productivity in the UK: N(1959) =670000, A2=$390, 
B=7500000, C=-0.02. 
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Figure 12. Observed and predicted productivity in Japan: N(1959)=2000000, A2=$400, 
B=4000000, C=-0.018.  
 
